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ABSTRACT
This paper considers and assesses various explanations attributed as principal factors of the recent 
Financial Crisis. In particular, it focuses on two principal regulatory tools which constitute the basis 
of the framework promulgated by recent Basel Committee's initiatives, that is, Basel III. These two 
regulatory tools being capital and liquidity requirements.
Various conclusions have been put forward to explain what triggered the recent Financial Crisis. 
This paper aims to explain why the Basel Committee's liquidity requirements and present proposals 
aimed at  addressing  liquidity risks,  still  represent  a  very modest  milestone  in  efforts  aimed at 
addressing challenges in prudential regulation and supervision. Even though problems attributed to 
capital  adequacy requirements  are  considered  by many authorities  to  have  triggered  the  recent 
Crisis, the paper will highlight how runs on banks are triggered by liquidity crises and that liquidity 
risks cannot be isolated from systemic risks. In so doing, it will incorporate the roles assumed by 
information  asymmetries  and market  based  regulation  – hence  elaborate  on how market  based 
regulation could serve to address problems which trigger liquidity risks. Imperfect knowledge being 
a factor which is contributory to liquidity crises and bank runs, and market based regulation being 
essential  in  facilitating disclosure -  since the Basel  Committee's  focus on banks and prudential 
supervision  cannot  on  its  own,  address  the  challenges  encountered  in  the  present  regulatory 
environment.
Furthermore,  it  will  address  measures  and  proposals  which  could  serve  as  bases  for  future 
regulatory  reforms  -  as  well  as  criticisms  and  challenges  still  encountered  by  recent  Basel 
Committee initiatives.
Key Words: capital; liquidity, Basel III, Basel Committee, lender of last resort, banks, insurance, 
securities,  information asymmetry,  market  based regulation,  bail  outs,  disclosure,  moral  hazard, 
Dodd Frank Act, Financial Crisis.
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Introduction
Two  vital  prudential  regulatory  tools  which  Basel  III  addresses,  namely  capital  and  liquidity 
requirements,  are  considered  to  be  instrumental  in  triggering  the  first  of  two  types  of  crises 
(banking crises). These crises, as identified by Lastra and Wood, are banking crises2 and financial 
crises.3 Even though various factors have been put forward as constituting principal contributory 
factors to the recent Crisis,4 the need to address liquidity requirements and particularly liquidity 
risks, – along with the role which market based regulation can assume to achieve this aim, will 
constitute the recurring theme of this paper.
The definition of liquidity,  as provided by the Bank of International Settlements  (BIS),  is  “the 
ability  of  a  bank  to  fund increases  in  assets  and  meet  obligations  as  they come  due,  without 
incurring unacceptable losses.  The fundamental  role  of banks in the maturity transformation of 
short-term deposits into long-term loans makes banks inherently vulnerable to liquidity risk, both of 
an institution-specific nature and that which affects markets as a whole.”5
A liquidity crisis is considered to be „the classic type of banking crisis whereby a bank for some 
reason,  cannot  meet  all  its  payment  obligations.“6 The  role  played  by imperfect  knowledge  in 
triggering such a crisis is further elaborated. In this sense, bank runs are triggered as a result of such 
„imperfect knowledge which customers have of their banks, and the links through the interbank 
market and payment system.“7
The ECB’s Financial Stability Review, identifies the fact that “the specific knowledge that banks 
possess  about  their  borrowers  make bank loans  particularly illiquid.”8 The  connection  between 
liquidity and systemic risks is further highlighted in the Review where it elaborates on possible 
consequences  resulting  from  a  bank’s  failure,  namely:9 The  “destruction”  of  such  specific 
knowledge which banks have about their  borrowers and the reduction of “the common pool of 
liquidity.”10 Such reduction in the common pool of liquidity may also trigger the failure of other 
banks – with the result  that  i)  the value of such illiquid bank assets  diminishes and ii)  further 
1 School of Social Sciences and Law, Oxford Brookes University. marianneojo@brookes.ac.uk
2 „Which affect the money stock and thus threaten the economy“; RM Lastra and G Wood, „The Crisis of 2007 – 09: 
Nature, Causes and Reactions“ Journal of International Economic Law 13(3) 531-550 at page 531
3 „Which may destroy wealth but do not endanger the economy as a whole“; ibid.
4 Those identified by Lastra and Wood include easy money, excessive leverage, risk management failures, bad 
lending, too big to fail policies, inadequate supervision and ill thought out regulation; see ibid.
5  Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision  Sept 2008 at page 1 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm>
6 See RM Lastra and G Wood, „The Crisis of 2007 – 09: Nature, Causes and Reactions“ Journal of International 
Economic Law 13(3) at pages 531 and 532
7 Ibid
8   “The Concept of Systemic Risk” Financial Stability Review December 2009 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/shared/pdf/ivbfinancialstabilityreview200912en.pdf?
a3fef6891f874a3bd40cd00aef38c64f at page 137
9  ibid 
10  ibid
problems within the banking systems are aggravated.11
In their  report  on “Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial  System: Measuring and Funding 
Liquidity Risk”, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) noted that at the onset of the recent financial 
crises, the complex response of financial institutions to deteriorating market conditions, was to a 
large extent, attributed to liquidity shortfalls which reflected “on and off balance sheet maturity 
mismatches and excessive levels of leverage.”12
For these reasons, even though it has been concluded that “the first crisis of the century was a 
capital crisis – not a liquidity crisis”,13 this paper advocates for greater attention to be accorded to 
the topic “liquidity”, as well as measures aimed at addressing liquidity shortfalls - such importance 
being  attributed  to  their  contributory roles  in  triggering  systemic  and resulting  banking  crises. 
Furthermore  the  paper  highlights  why  greater  focus  on  insurance  and  securities  regulation  is 
required since the most effective tools in addressing systemic risk, to a greater extent, will require 
the implementation of market based regulation. In addressing some issues which may constitute 
some areas of consideration in future Basel reforms, the first section not only commences with a 
consideration of the importance of the role of the lender of last resort in liquidity crises, but also 
consideration of the need to incorporate the role which central banks are capable of assuming as 
lenders of last resort in Basel Liquidity Risk Measurements. From this perspective, even though it 
may not be feasible to incorporate such function in Basel liquidity risk measurements, this provides 
a suitable forum for the consideration of how market based regulation could contribute in assisting 
to mitigate situations whereby moral hazard could arise.
A discussion of the need for greater extension of regulation to the securities and insurance industries 
will not only constitute the topic of discussion in section two, but also partly serve as justification 
for facilitating market based regulation. The role played by non bank institutions in triggering the 
recent Financial Crisis also serves as further evidence and justification for the need for greater focus 
in  extending  regulation  to  the  insurance  and  securities  sectors.  Furthermore,  the  section  will 
highlight and elaborate on the links between moral hazard, market based regulation, transparency 
and disclosure.
A brief analysis of other criticisms which have arisen – as well as challenges presented by recent 
Basel initiatives, will be provided under section three before a conclusion is drawn.
I. The Importance of the Role of the Lender of Last Resort and Liquidity Crises.
Two quotations are considered by Lastra and Wood as providing the best clarification to i) how a 
lender of last resort operation by the central bank can stop a liquidity crisis, and ii) what constitutes 
a liquidity crisis.
The first of these makes reference to Thornton's 1802 quotation:14 
11  ibid
12 Report of the Financial Stability Forum on “Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System: Measuring and 
Funding Liquidity Risk”  http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf at page 24
13 See RM Lastra and G Wood, „The Crisis of 2007 – 09: Nature, Causes and Reactions“ Journal of International 
Economic Law 13(3) at page 535.
14 See RM Lastra and G Wood, „The Crisis of 2007 – 09: Nature, Causes and Reactions“ Journal of International 
Economic Law 13(3) at page 532 and also see H Thornton, An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper 
Credit of Great Britain (London: J Hatchard and F and C Rivington, 1802)
− If any bank fails, a general run upon the neighbouring banks is apt to take place, which if 
not checked, in the beginning by a pouring into the circulation of a very large quantity of 
gold, leads to a very extensive mischief.
The second relates to Bagehot's quotation - which is as follows: 15
− What is wanted and what is necessary to stop a panic is to diffuse the impression that though 
money may be dear, money is still to be had.“
One shortcoming of  the  Basel  Committee  in  its  recent  proposals  which  relate  to  liquidity  risk 
measurements16, as identified by Scott17 is its “failure to factor in the role of central banks as lenders 
of last resort.” Even though he highlights the Basel Committee's acknowledgement of the fact that 
particular runs18 are less likely for certain institutions (where a deposit base and deposit insurance 
exists)19 than  is  the  case  for  institutions  with  greater  wholesale  funding,  he  also  adds  that  the 
likelihood of runs occurring in the case of banks with a high percentage of liabilities in deposits still 
exists – this being attributed to either limited deposit insurance amounts or irrational depositors. 
Where  such circumstances  arise,  that  is,  where  limited  deposit  insurance  amounts  or  irrational 
depositors exist, such circumstances, in his opinion, provide the opportunity whereby central banks 
have functioned as lenders of last resort to banks which are able to “post adequate collateral.” He 
however  criticises  the  Basel  Committee's  failure  to  factor  such  possibility  or  fact  in  its 
calculations.20
The role of market based regulation in mitigating excessive risk taking levels – hence addressing 
risks posed by irrational depositors or negligent management comes into play.  Furthermore,  the 
need to adequately and promptly discern those banks which should be provided with assistance 
from lender of last resort arrangements – hence avoiding moral hazard is of primary importance. 
The Basel Committe's recent initiatives in amending Pillar III reflect its efforts in facilitating market 
discipline. Its recent amendments to Pillar 3 of Basel II, include a statement that “banks need to 
make disclosures  that  reflect  their  real  risk profile  as markets  evolve over  time”,  are  aimed at 
strengthening guiding principles of Pillar 3 (as provided for under paragraph 809).21
Other  measures  aimed  at  enhancing  disclosure  requirements  relate  to  areas  which  include 
“securitisation exposures in the trading book and sponsorship of off balance sheet vehicles.”22 
15 See RM Lastra and G Wood, „The Crisis of 2007 – 09: Nature, Causes and Reactions“ Journal of International 
Economic Law 13(3) at page 533 and W Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (London: 
Henry S King & Co, 1873)
16 Basel Committe on Banking Supervision, „International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and 
Monitoring“, (December 2009) <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs165.pdf>
17 See H Scott „Reducing Systemic Risk Through the Reform of Capital Regulation“ Journal of International 
Economic Law 13(3) at page 772
18 Runs on banks caused by the insolvency of other banks
19 Hence justifying the fact that banks have not traditionally been required to retain sufficient liquidity to survive a run 
on banks caused by the insolvency of other banks
20 In  this  sense  Scott  is  referring  to  the  Basel  Committee's  liquidity  proposal  of  December  2009,  whereby  two 
objectives were formulated: (i) „that banks should have sufficient high quality liquid resources to survive anacute 
stress scenario lasting one month, formalized in a Liquidity Coverage Ratio and (ii) that banks should have stable 
funding in the longer term, formalized in a Net Stable Funding Ratio.“
21 See Consultative Document of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision “Proposed Enhancements to the Basel 
II Framework January 2009” < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs150.pdf> and the finalised proposals for enhancing the 
Basel II framework : “Enhancements to the Basel II Framework” July 2009 – particularly “Changes to the Pillar 3 
Disclosure Requirements” at page 29 < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs157.pdf>
22 See  Summary  of  Impact  Assessment  document  amending  Capital  Requirements  Directive  on  trading  book, 
securitization issues and remuneration policies – particularly section 5.3 on “Disclosure of Securitization Risks”
at page 5 <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/summary_en.pdf>
According to the Summary of the Impact Assessment Document, such amendments are not only 
aimed at improving investors’ understanding of risk profiles of banks, but also aimed at reinforcing 
bank risk management incentives – by allowing market participants to exercise discipline.23
Just as the exercise of discipline by market participants could serve as an impediment to excessive 
risk taking levels, conversely, moral hazard serves as an impediment to market based regulation. 
The capacity of deposit insurance to serve as an impediment to forces of market discipline has been 
highlighted. In illustrating its impact on market discipline, Kaufman states that the substantial and 
easily  relatively  reduced  losses  to  bank  depositors,  federal  deposit  insurance  corporation,  loan 
customers and users of the payments system – as well as the reduction in levels of bank failures 
(generally), may result in the potential for “even temporary disruptions in either bank-loan customer 
relations or the payments system (through increasing capital requirements and enforcing prompt 
regulatory corrective intervention and least cost resolution provisions).”24
Further means whereby excessive levels of risk taking could be controlled have been advocated. 
These  include  the  implementation  of  financial  taxes  as  means  of  enhancing  the  regulation  of 
financial  markets.25 Financial  taxes  are  considered  to  have  three  main  objectives:  (i)  „to  limit 
excessive risk-taking,  (ii)  to provide an insurance or resolution fund for systemically important 
institutions and (iii) to help pay for global public goods.“ It is also emphasized that these three 
objectives are separable, both in their economic rationale and in practice.26
Kern distinguishes between the FSC (Financial Stability Contribution) which he highlights as being 
primarily designed as an insurance fund to pay retrospectively for the resolution or bailout of a large 
systemically  important  or  too-interconnected-to-fail  bank  or  financial  institution  and,  the  FAT 
(Financial Activities Tax) – which he highlights as being primarily applied prospectively to deter 
excessive risk-taking.27
His criticism of the bank balance sheet  tax is  that  it  will  fail  to deter  banks from engaging in 
excessive risk-taking and will not generate adequate revenue to pay for a resolution fund because 
most banks will avoid the tax by shifting risky assets and liabilities off balance sheet to affiliates 
and related entities located outside the taxing jurisdiction and that such weaknesses of the proposed 
bank balance sheet tax suggest that policy-makers should consider the merits of a FTT (Financial 
Transaction  Tax)  that  would  be  applied  by  national  governments  and  collected  by  banks  and 
dealers.28
23 ibid
24 “Such provisions”, in Kaufman’s opinion, “attempt to mimic forces of market discipline in an insured depositor 
environment.” GG Kaufman “Bank Contagion: A Review of the Theory and Evidence” Journal of Financial Services 
Research Volume 8 No 2 at page 143 and 144; For further information on the impact of deposit insurance on market 
discipline, see M Ojo, „The need for government and central bank intervention in financial regulation: Free banking 
and  the  challenges  of  information  uncertainty.“  http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23298/ at  page  6  of  15  and 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1624918 at page 5
25 See A Kern, „International Regulatiory Reform and Financial Taxes“ Journal of International Economic Law (13) 3 
and particularly page 894. 
26 „The first objective, limiting excessive risk-taking, is derived from the desire to price risk efficiently. In this case, 
how the funds are used subsequently is not of primary concern. Second, the proposition that such funds might be 
used to build an insurance fund is an entirely separate argument related not to mitigating the riskiness of financial 
transactions but to pricing accurately the implicit insurance provided to institutions deemed too big or too inter-
connected to fail. The provision of assistance to those most affected by ill-chosen risk-taking is a third component of 
an efficient pricing strategy. Hence the objective of efficient pricing may be pursued by adopting all three goals at 
once, or by pursuing them separately.“ Ibid
27 Ibid at page 896
28 Ibid at page 897
II. The Extension of Regulation to the Insurance and Securities Industry
As  stated  in  a  previous  paper,29 there  is  growing  justification  for  greater  measures  aimed  at 
extending capital rules to the securities markets. This not only arises from increased conglomeration 
and globalisation – which increases risks attributed to systemic contagion, but also the fact that „the 
globalisation of financial markets has made it possible for investors and capital seeking companies 
to switch to lightly regulated or completely unregulated markets.”
In his paper, Scott argues that two of the most important policies for dealing with systemic risk are 
namely:  the  imposition  of  capital  requirements  (or  limits  on  leverage)  and  the  use  of  market 
discipline in calibrating, enforcing and regulating these requirements.30
Furthermore he adds that „Without eliminating all but assured bailouts for systemically important 
institutions, creditors will not adequately police financial institution’s capital. And, without the right 
information, the market will be unable to estimate the right amount of capital.“
The importance of addressing moral hazard, its impact on market discipline and the need for greater 
transparency  in  financial  regulation  is  thus  emphasised  again.  Interestingly  enough,  whilst 
transparency is essential in facilitating disclosure and the right information, it is also considered to 
facilitate moral hazard.31 Kaufmann and Weber argue that amongst those reasons put forward as the 
basis for limiting regulatory transparency, the first phenomenon is the risk of moral hazard. „On the 
one hand, an investor will undoubtedly have an interest in knowing the consequences in the case 
that  a  financial  institution  becomes  insolvent.  From his  or  her  perspective,  any guarantee  that 
potential losses will be covered by the state or insurance contributes to certainty. On the other hand, 
from an economic perspective, insolvent— in contrast to ‘only’ illiquid—financial institutions must 
not be rescued.“32
Transparency, in their view, could however achieve its aim of „anchoring financial regulation within 
the constitutional framework“ through the establishment of clear responsibilities and procedures - 
thereby reducing moral hazard.33
The “conventional justification” for regulation within the securities market is attributed to the fact 
that “exchanges on securities markets lead to external effects (for non participating and therefore 
non-considered third parties)”.34Consequently public interest arises – which is aimed at “protecting 
potentially disadvantaged parties” (owing to reasons attributed to market structure and information 
asymmetry).35
29 See  M  Ojo,  „The  Impact  of  Capital  and  Disclosure  Requirements  on  Risks  and  Risk  Taking 
Incentives“<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1547023>  and  http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/20404/1/MPRA_paper_20404.pdf at page 5 of 17
30 See H Scott „Reducing Systemic Risk Through the Reform of Capital Regulation“ Journal of International 
Economic Law 13(3) at page 763
31 For further information on the need to limit regulatory transparency because of moral hazard, see C Kaufmann and 
R Weber, Transparency: „Role of Transparency in Financial Regulation“ Journal of International Economic Law at 
page 784.
32 „Concerns about moral hazard are one of the reasons why many countries and the European Union (EU) decided not 
to publish, or not even to establish, rules on which an institution would act as a lender of last resort and under what 
conditions.“ ibid
33 Ibid at page 787
34 See „Securities Market Regulation: International Approaches“ Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report January
2006 at page 36
35 ibid
The role played by non bank institutions in triggering the recent Financial Crisis also serves as 
evidence and justification for the need for greater focus in extending regulation to the insurance and 
securities sectors. The need by the Basel Committee, the Financial Stability Forum and the G20 to 
address future runs which could still be caused by liquidity problems experienced at non-banks, 
including hedge funds, has been highlighted.36
Transparency
Even though information asymmetry could be considered to constitute a greater basis for regulation 
within the securities markets,  the existence of information asymmetry within the banking sector 
also has the potential to generate systemic effects within the banking sector – consequences whose 
effects, it could be said, could have greater repercussions than if such were to originate from within 
the securities markets.
Principles for transparency, as established under constitutional law, are also regarded by Kaufmann 
and Weber as being applicable to financial regulation. A comprehensive , rule-based – rather than a 
purely process-oriented approach, which also implies a three dimensional concept of transparency37 
in financial regulation, is proposed.38
Their proposed first dimension refers to institutional aspects, i.e. procedures and decision making. 
These two elements, in their view, having already been identified in a similar way, especially in the 
context of internet transparency, yet within a conceptually different framework.“39
By  providing  legal  certainty,  transparency  in  their  opinion,  serves  as  an  anchor  for  financial 
regulation - „the basis for establishing trust, which is the key element of any financial system.“ 
According to their second dimension, transparency is understood as „the substantive backbone of 
financial regulation which lays open the values and goals of financial policy and regulation“.40
The third dimension refers to the accountability of actors as an „essential element for rebuilding 
confidence in the financial system.“41
36 Even though the conversion of US investment banks to banks serves to diminish the scope issue with the Basel 
rules,  Scott  also argues  that  the major overall  problem in the Basel  Committee’s  approach to  both capital  and 
liquidity is that its requirements only focused on banks. He makes reference to the recent crisis and the fact banks 
are not the only institutions that can trigger or be the victims of a liquidity crisis. „The assisted acquisition of Bear 
Stearns, the conservatorship of AIG, and the failure of the Reserve Primary Fund, a money market fund, triggered 
liquidity runs whose  victims  included,  but  were  not  limited  to,  banks.  See  H Scott  „Reducing  Systemic  Risk 
Through the Reform of Capital Regulation“ Journal of International Economic Law at page 773
37 C Kaufmann and R Weber, Transparency: „Role of Transparency in Financial Regulation“ Journal of International 
Economic Law at page 779. 
38 Ibid at page 781.
39 See ibid at page 779; Further, this constitutional dimension, in their view, defines the procedures and institutions by 
which financial markets are being regulated.A key issue and illustrative example provided by them in this regard is 
the too-big-to-fail problem in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Financial regulation in their opinion, needs to 
„define the applicable procedures for addressing this problem as well as the competent institutions.“ Further, „this 
requires a political decision which, regardless of its content, needs to be made transparent. From a transparency 
perspective, it is thus irrelevant whether a country opts for a ‘political’ solution by involviere parliament or prefers 
to take a ‘technical’ approach by engaging supervisory authorities and the central bank. The key is that whatever 
decision is made it is laid open and thus fosters credibility of the system as a whole.“see ibid at page 796
40 This second dimension is elaborated on as having two aspects: making the objectives and underlying values of 
public financial  policy transparent  whilst  ensuring that  information is  both accessible and comprehensible.  The 
essential  element  being quality,  not  quantity,  of  information. A current  example provided in this context  is  the 
transparency of central bank objectives. See ibid at page 796
41 This dimension, in their opinion, also addresses  accountability  as another important aspect of good governance. 
„Given the variety of actors and the multitude of standards applicable to financial markets, ensuring accountability 
III. Other Criticisms and Challenges Presented by Recent Basel Reforms
Recent Basel reforms relating to liquidity risk measurements and risk weightings have experienced 
their  fair  share of criticisms – as partly illustrated under section one.  Furthermore,  section two 
highlights why criticisms have arisen as a result of the Basel Committee's focus on the banking 
sector.  The  reliability  of  credit  ratings  (in  view  of  the  recent  Financial  Crisis)  as  means  of 
determining  risk  weights,  basic  reforms  relating  to  securitisation  (as  effective  from December 
2010),  and  the  impediment  faced  by  the  Basel  reforms  which  relate  to  securitizations  and 
resecuritizations as presented by the Dodd Frank Act42(which prevents US regulators from relying 
on credit ratings in any regulation – thus making the implementation of Basel reforms relating to 
securitization and resecuritizations impossible),  have also been highlighted.43 Whilst consistency 
and reliability with its  measurements  constitutes an issue which the Basel  Committee needs  to 
address,44 enforcement is also another in need of redress. A system geared towards a more rule 
based approach would definitely foster greater accountability than a principles based approach to 
regulation.
As  well  as  the  consideration  of  the  adequacy and  effectiveness  of  recently  proposed  liquidity 
measures,  the  transition  period  for  the  implementation  of  such  rules  has  also  proved  to  be  a 
contentious  topic.  As  highlighted  in  a  previous  paper,  whilst  some  elements  of  the  recent 
announcements relating to the new framework (for Basel III) are considered by certain jurisdictions 
to be disappointing - owing to the fact that more stringent definitions for capital had been expected, 
the phase in periods have been welcomed by several jurisdictions.45
IV. Conclusion
Macro  prudential  regulation  (as  the  most  effective  means  of  addressing  systemic  risk  and 
maintaining financial stability) and the need for greater focus on liquidity risk related measures and 
needs to be addressed from different perspectives. The concept proposed here is based on the distinction between the 
accountability of states and private actors and their contribution to restoring confidence in the financial system. The 
result is a threefold matrix for transparent financial regulation, relating to public and private actors and including the 
international dimension.“see ibid at 796
42 The Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
43 See  H  Scott,„Reducing  Systemic  Risk  Through  the  Reform  of  Capital  Regulation“  Journal  of  International 
Economic  Law  13(3)  at  pages  766-767.  In  addition,  Scott  adds  that  the  risk  weighting  process  is  not  only 
„methodologically suspect – but also subject to political pressure.“ In this respect he adds :„Can there be any other 
reason why all residential mortgages (prime or subprime) were risk-weighted at 50% in Basel I, while all other 
secured debt to the private sector was risk-weighted at 100%? Indeed, Basel II was even worse, dropping the risk-
weight on residential mortgages to 35%.
Clearly, assigning low risk-weights for residential mortgages was part of the strategy of the USA to promote home 
ownership, using risk-weights as a means of credit allocation. In addition, the latest revision to Basel II in July 2009, 
also effective in December 2010, increased capital for market risk (changes in value) of a bank’s trading book. 
These changes also include a stressed value-at-risk (VaR) requirement, which the Committee believes will  help 
dampen the cyclicality of the minimum regulatory capital framework. Again, the issue is whether regulators can get 
these capital charges right. While in the past capital requirements seem to have been too low, the risk for the future 
may be that they are too high, which would unnecessarily dampen economic recovery.“ see ibid at pages 766 -767
44 An interesting observation also highlighted by Scott  relates to the different  levels of leverage requirements for 
depository banks – when compared to investment banks (which do not take deposits) – the leverage levels of deposit 
banks being much lower than those of investment banks. See ibid at page 766.
45 For further information on this, as well as the impact of phase in periods on „silent participations“, see M Ojo, 
„Basel III and Responding to the Recent Financial Crisis: Progress made by the Basel Committee in relation to the 
Need  for  Increased  Bank  Capital  and  Increased  Quality  of  Loss  Absorbing  Capital“  http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/25291/ and http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1680886
tools  constitute  recurring  themes  from  the  recent  crisis.  In  agreement  with  Miles46,  capital 
requirments, and explicit limits on gearing constitute more direct means of controlling leverage. 
Basel  reforms  (and  Basel  III  in  particular)  have  evolved  considerably  to  address  capital 
requirements.  „Financial  stability,  could  be  preserved  by  directing  policy  instruments  at  debt 
gearing (or leverage) – and with banks, this could be achieved through a prevention in the initial 
(limited) fall in the value of assets and by ensuring that banks are able to withstand falls in asset 
values through sufficient loss absorbing capital – rather than expecting monetary policy (changes in 
interest  rates)  to  substantially  reduce  asset  price  variability.“47 Other  proposals  have  been 
highlighted as the way forward, in achieving the goal of maintaining financial stability.48
The role of market based regulation in mitigating excessive risk taking levels – hence addressing 
risks  posed  by  irrational  depositors  or  negligent  management,  not  only  serves  as  a  means  of 
addressing the problem of moral hazard, but also serves as a means whereby accountability could be 
fostered (through greater transparency and facilitation of disclosure requirements). Even though it is 
argued  that  the  limitation  of  regulatory transparency serves  a  basis  for  limiting  moral  hazard, 
transparency,  it  is  further  argued (and less  contentiously),  could  achieve  its  aim of  „anchoring 
financial  regulation  within  the  constitutional  framework“  through  the  establishment  of  clear 
responsibilities and procedures - thereby reducing moral hazard.
To conclude, market based regulation serves as a means of addressing the rationale for financial 
regulation – which embodies two issues; namely, the issue related to systemic risks and that related 
to  information  asymmetry.  Market  based  regulation  would  not  only  help  address  problems 
attributed to systemic risks and excessive risk taking levels, but also information asymmetries – 
hence addressing liquidity risks. 
46 See D Miles, „Leverage and Monetary Policy“, Speech by David Miles, Member of the Monetary Policy Committee 
of the Bank of England at the Economic and Social Research Institute Foundation for Fiscal Studies, 12 October 
2010 at page 9 <http://www.bis.org/review/r101018e.pdf> and M Ojo,  The Role of Monetary Policy in Matters 
Relating to  Financial  Stability:  Monetary Policy Responses  Adopted  During  the  Most  Recent  Financial  Crisis 
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26925/ and http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1713647
47 ibid
48 These include: (i) increased integration of banking, securities and insurance supervision ; (ii) transferring the macro-
prudential supervisory function to the central  bank; (iii)  articulation of the relation between macro- and micro-
supervisors through a management by exception system involving direct  authority of the macro-supervisor over 
enforcement and allocation of tasks; (iv) given the difficulty of measuring output on supervisory tasks, the systemic 
risk supervisor must necessarily be more accountable and less independent than central banks are on their monetary 
task; (v) the supervisory agency cannot rely on high-powered incentives to motivate supervisors, and must rely on 
culture instead; (vi) the supervisor must limit its reliance on self regulation; and (vii) the international system should 
substitute the current loose, networked structure with a more centralized and hierarchical one. See RM Lastra and L 
Garicano,  „Towards  a  new  Architecture  For  Financial  Stability  :  Seven  Principles  „  Journal  of  International 
Economic Law 13(3) at page 597
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